I've given it a once-over, and it's coming with me to drill weekend for some by-the-headlamp reading on Saturday night.
Although I admit when I first heard about it I was afraid it was just more dumping on the S2 (I think the S2 is often the hardest-worked and most-underappreciated shop in a Tactical Operations Center), I think Flynn is saying more about the way S2 (Military Intelligence) personnel are being used overseas.
For starters, there are way too many top-heavy Intel shops that are too close the flagpole. I've never set foot in Afghanistan, but one thing I can say for certain is that in any part of Iraq that I saw from 06-08, there were always too many S2 personnel working at the upper echelons, while the tactical elements were starving for more.
What I believe General Flynn is saying is that it's those elements -- the ones actually doing the foot patrols and the mounted convoys -- who need people writing reports that move up the chain, and pushing other reporting and expertise to the joes.
What we certainly DON'T need are large self-licking ice cream cones of people making endless pretty PowerPoint slides for an O-6 or above, patting themselves on the back, writing up their Bronze Star citations and calling it a day.
What tactical value are those people providing?
I thought this was a particularly good nugget from the report:
By implication, I believe that Flynn is saying this is not currently the case -- there are too many people "hiding away" without any connection to a maneuver element that can benefit from the product they're providing, or, in turn, provide them with real, on-the-ground insight as to what's going on in the towns and villages.
"Leaders must put time and energy into selecting the best, most extroverted and hungriest analysts to serve in the Stability Operations Information Centers."